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Introduction
The option of a second attempt to pass an exam creates a windfall gain, rational students respond with a decline in e¤ort at the …rst attempt and thus a decline in the pass probability (Kooreman, 2013) . The ‡ip side of the coin: due to ill-prepared and/or less motivated students, the school bears (part of) the burden of the second attempt, the student windfall gain is no one-to-one gain in social welfare. The school has an incentive to substitute a more restrictive examination rule for an unconditional second attempt in order to manipulate student e¤ort. Such rules are, for instance, a charge for a resit, a cap on the maximum resit mark, an adjustment of the passing standard, a variation of the time span between two attempts, a minimum requirement to qualify for the second attempt, and a malus points account. In a theoretical model of higher education we show how these rules a¤ect student e¤ort and how they di¤er with respect to the overall pass probability.
The determination of student learning e¤ort is the topic of a wide body of theoretical and empirical literature (see, e.g., Bishop Bonesrønning and Opstad, 2015) . Nonetheless, this literature says very little about how student e¤ort is a¤ected by examination arrangements and rules. This paper aims at …lling this gap.
The Model

Setup
We distinguish between two groups of agents, schools and students. The school announces a passing standardq, and any student with a test scorepasses the exam. The outcome of the exam is assumed to be binary, pass or fail. Following Kuehn and Landeras (2014) , the test score q is the sum of the student's educational attainment (e) and a random variable ". The educational attainment function is supposed to be linear in the student learning e¤ort e: (e) = e. The test score is given by
The case of an attainment function with decreasing returns is considered in the numerical example of Section 4. The random variable " is distributed according to a continuous, symmetrical and single-peaked function F (") with F 0 (") = f (") and E(") = 0. The probability of passing the exam is given by prob(q q) = 1 prob (" <q e) = 1 F (q e): 
Setting the Passing Standard
The school's objective function is speci…ed as
where we assume that the school is interested in the student educational attainment (e). Since we abstract from di¤erent levels of student ability, e¤ort is the only variable the school can a¤ect by setting the passing standardq. But improving attainment by setting a higher standard is not costfree. Such costs include improving the quality of buildings, room equipment and computer facilities, upgrading lecturers'quali…cations, the assessment of a higher number of (resit) exams, the time lecturers spend on the preparation of courses, the lecturers' enthusiasm, more tutorials, and so on (see De Fraja et al., 2010) . We capture the costs of setting a passing standard by the function (q) with 0 (q) > 0 and 00 (q) > 0. The …rst-order condition for the optimal passing standard,
states that in the optimum the marginal costs of setting the standard are equal to the marginal utility gain in terms of a higher attainment. The necessary condition for an optimal passing standard is a positive impact ofq on e¤ort e. Put another way, the assumption of a costly standard setting allows us to restict the analysis to the case of de dq > 0.
One versus Two Exam Scenario
Suppose the student has two attempts to pass the exam, the second attempt is o¤ered unconditionally. The risk-neutral student maximizes expected utility
with the continuation payo¤ CP p 2 R 2 V (e 2 ) > 0 (see Weinschenk, 2012) . The parameter p i is the passing probability, R i is the reward for passing the exam (the disutility of a fail is normalized to zero), i (i = 1; 2) indicates the …rst and second attempt, and D is a dummy variable. The e¤ort costs V (e i ) are increasing and convex: V 0 (e i ) > 0 and V 00 (e i ) > 0. An inner solution is guaranteed by V (0) = 0 and V 0 (0) = 0. The passing probability p 2 is given by p 2 = 1 F (q e 2 e 1 ), where 2 [0; 1] re ‡ects the idea that resit students may have an advantage at the second attempt. They already have some basic knowledge of the course content and course material, they are more familiar with the questioning technique ("memory e¤ect").
First consider the one exam opportunity (D = 0). The …rst-order condition (FOC) of the maximization of (4) with respect to e 1 reads V 0 (e 1 ) = R 1 f (q 1 e 1 ) : The optimal e¤ort is given at the point where the marginal costs are equal to the increase in the passing probability times the reward for passing. Totally di¤erentiating this FOC with respect toq 1 yields
The optimal standard (3)) requires f 0 ( ) > 0, which also leads to the (full…lled) secondorder conditition EU 00 < 0: Hence, we can restrict the analysis to the left-hand side of the modal. The pass probability will thus be greater than 0.5.
Note that this result extends the result obtained by Kuehn and Landeras (2014) . These authors assume zero marginal costs, 0 (q 1 ) = 0, so that it is optimal to set a standard such as to maximize student e¤ort,
But this is equivalent to choosing aq 1 where f 0 ( ) = 0, and the exam very much resembles a lottery with a …fty-…fty chance of passing and failing. The claim that it is optimal from the school's point of view to have a failure rate of 0.5, is not very convincing. From our point of view, it is an unpleasant feature of their framework resulting from the implausible assumption of costfree standard setting.
In the two exam scenario (D = 1), the model has to be solved by backward induction. The FOC for the optimal e 2 reads
For > 0, the student in his second (last) attempt is not just back in the situation of a one exam opportunity. The …rst-attempt e¤ort e 1 raises the passing probability p 2 for any level of e 2 . Consequently, the marginal utility gain of e 2 in terms of an increase in the passing probability p 2 is lower and hence the optimal e 2 will be lower compared to the one exam scenario. Only if we switch o¤ the memory e¤ect by setting = 0, does the second attempt replicate the one exam opportunity. For the optimal e 1 , the FOC is given by
For = 0, we replicate Kooreman (2013) . Knowing that one has a second attempt constitutes a continuation payo¤ (windfall gain), implying a lower reward of e¤ort at the …rst attempt and thus a lower e 1 compared to the case of the one exam scenario. Having more than two attempts reinforces this e¤ect (Weinschenk, 2012) . For > 0, we observe two additional e¤ects. First, a higher e 1 may now count twice, since it now increases both p 1 and p 2 , generating an incentive to invest more e 1 . This e¤ect is captured by the second summand on the right-hand side of (6). Second, CP becomes larger when > 0, lowering the …rst summand on the right-hand side of (6).
In order to reach a given level of p 2 , a memory e¤ect allows for a reduction of e 1 . The net e¤ect of a stronger on e 1 is ambiguous. Our simulations suggest that de 1 =d < 0 is the most relevant scenario. The impact of a stronger memory e¤ect on the overall pass probability P = p 1 + (1 p 1 )p 2 is ambiguous too. Let us summarize:: Proposition 1 A costly and optimal standard setting combined with an optimal e¤ort level requires f 0 ( ) > 0, which implies that pass probabilities will be greater than 0.5.
Proposition 2 (Kooreman, 2013, and Weinschenk, 2012) The utility-maximizing response to the option of an unconditional second attempt is a decline in e¤ort e 1 and thus a decline in the pass probability p 1 .
Proposition 3
If e 1 raises the passing probability p 2 (memory e¤ect), then (i) e 2 declines, and (ii) e 1 declines for a wide range of parameter values. (iii) The overall pass probability P may increase or decrease.
Student E¤ort and Examination Rules
The school is assumed to substitute one of the examination rules discussed below for the unconditional second attempt.
Charge for the Second Attempt
The student windfall gain constitutes a positive willingness to pay for a second attempt. At least in the UK, it is quite common to impose a charge for a resit exam in order to internalize the negative externality. With Z denoting the charge for the second attempt, student expected utility is given by
The optimal e 2 is not a¤ected by Z. Since any student who participates in the second attempt, has to pay the fee, the fee works like a lump sum tax. However, an increase in Z leads to an increase in e 1 . Totally di¤erentiating the FOC
0 (e 1 ) = 0 with respect to Z yields
Avoiding the fee at the second attempt is equivalent to an increase in R 1 , students work harder to meet the passing standard. The passing probabilities p 1 and P increase in Z. By setting Z = CP , the school eliminates the windfall gain and thus the incentive to reduce e 1 . Both attempts now replicate the one exam opportunity. Moreover, for Z = CP , a positive memory e¤ect has no incentive-destroying e¤ect, the rise in the continuation payo¤ will be "taxed away" by a higher charge. The positive e¤ect of a double use of e 1 remains, and, in contrast to Weinschenk (2012) , the optimal e¤ort declines over time (e 1 > e 2 ). We summarize:
Proposition 4 A charge for the second attempt (i) is neutral for e 2 , and (ii) increases e 1 , p 1 and P . (iii) For Z = CP , the windfall gain vanishes, students exert an e¤ort level as if each attempt were the …nal attempt. Due to the memory e¤ect, (iv) e¤ort is decreasing over time .
Cap on the Maximum Resit Mark
Resit marks may be di¤erent from …rst-attempt marks. In the UK, resit marks are usually capped at the pass threshold (40-50%), so that even a resit exam with a maximum score of 100% will be graded with the mark "su¢ cient". A less radical proposal, implemented in Uruguay, improves the informational content of the transcript of records and/or exam report by mentioning the number of attempts needed for the pass. Communicating this number is an informative signal, and it is easy to administer.
These measures are captured by lowering the reward for the second attempt, R 2 . Totally di¤erentiating the FOCs (5) and (6) with respect to R 2 yields
The decline in R 2 moves the e¤ort levels in opposite directions. Students work less hard at the second attempt, but due to the decline in the continuation payo¤, they will work harder at the …rst attempt. A positive memory e¤ect minors the decline in CP by a higher p 2 , but even for = 1 the memory e¤ect does not neutralize the e¤ect of a lower R 2 . Concerning the passing probabilities we observe dp 1 dR 2 < 0 and dp 2 dR 2 = f (q 2 e 2 e 1 )
If there is no memory e¤ect, the multiplier is positive, p 2 goes down. Only for a large memory e¤ect, the dual use of e 1 may overcompensate the decline in e 2 , so that p 2 goes up. The impact on P cannot be signed unambiguously. But our simulations suggest that for almost all parameter constellations the positive e¤ect of a lower continuation payo¤ outweighs the negative e¤ect of a reduction of e 2 , so that P goes up.
Proposition 5 A decline in R 2 induces (i) a decline in e 2 , (ii) an increase in e 1 , (ii) an increase in p 1 , (iv) a decrease in p 2 (unless the memory e¤ect is very strong). (v) The overall passing probability P increases for almost all parameter constellations.
Adjustment of the Resit Passing Standard
By de…nition, the score of the resit students was in the lower tail of the distribution. If the bad score re ‡ects low ability and/or low e¤ort, then the resit students are a biased sample. On the other hand, we know from the literature that the resit pass rate is comparable to the …rst attempt pass rate (see, e.g., McManus, 1992; Scott, 2012), we do not observe the expected decline in the pass rate. Pell et al. (2009) argue that usually the resit is not undertaken in conjunction with any other assessment, so students can concentrate on this assessment alone. Resit students may receive extra classes. These factors put resit students at an unfair advantage over …rst attempt students. To create a level playing …eld, they propose a higher passing standard for the resit. How are the optimal e¤ort levels a¤ected by such an adjustment of the passing standardq 2 ? Totally di¤erentiating the …rst-order conditions (5) and (6) with respect toq 2 yields:
The optimal response to a higher passing standardq 2 is a higher level of e¤ort at the second attempt. But the increase in e 2 and thus the increase in the expected test score q 2 is lower than the increase inq 2 (note that de 2 dq 2 < 1), the second attempt pass probability p 2 declines. The increase in e¤ort does not compensate for the increase in the passing standard. 1 The expectation of a higher e 2 combined with a lower p 2 triggers a positive side e¤ect. Because of the lower continuation payo¤, students have an incentive to exert more e¤ort at the …rst attempt, e 1 and thus p 1 goes up. A memory e¤ect mitigates the decline in p 2 . The overall passing probability cannot be signed unambiguously. Our simulation results are mixed. For reasonable values of the memory e¤ect, the increase in p 1 does not overcompensate the decline in p 2 and the overall pass rate P decreases. Only for a very strong memory e¤ect, P may increase.
Proposition 6
Consider an increase in the resit passing standardq 2 . This leads to (i) an increase in e¤ort e 2 , (ii) an increase in e¤ort e 1 , (iii) an increase in the passing probability p 1 , (iv) a decline in the passing probability p 2 , and (v) a decline in the overall pass probability P (for reasonable values of the memory e¤ect).
Time Span Between Attempts
The time span between the …rst and the second attempt di¤ers across both schools and countries. In Germany, the second exam opportunity is, in general, about six months after the …rst exam. Students have to repeat all lectures/classes/seminars. In the UK, the study year ends with the main assessment in May. Students with a fail have to take a resit, which takes place in August. There is no possibility to attend lectures again. Shortening the time span between the attempts in ‡uences the learning strategy. In our model we put the shortening of the time span to the extreme, putting it to zero. Such a scenario perfectly mimics multiple choice tests in an E-Learning center.
A zero time span means that the only choice variable is e 1 , which, if necessary, can be used twice. The continuation payo¤ now turns out to be CP = p 2 R 2 . Since the e¤ort costs V (e 2 ) drop out, CP goes up, c.p. The pass probability at the second attempt is p 2 = 1 F (q 2 e 1 ), so that the FOC for the optimal e 1 reads
where we make use of the simplifying assumption of identical passing standards,q 1 = q 2 . Compared to the one exam opportunity, we observe two e¤ects. The second chance creates a continuation payo¤, implying a decline in e 1 . But the chance of using e 1 twice increases the expected marginal utility gain of e 1 , implying an increase in e 1 . Since the fail probability F ( ) is smaller than 0.5, the former e¤ect always dominates the latter e¤ect, which can be seen from CP F ( )
In other words, the second chance immediately after the …rst attempt is a disincentive for exerting e¤ort to meet the passing standard.
Compared to the case of two attempts with a substantial time span between these attempts, we obtain a strong increase in e 1 , since the students have no option to increase their e¤ort after a fail at the …rst attempt. Thus, p 1 increases, whereas p 2 decreases. The net e¤ect on P is ambiguous.
Proposition 7
Shortening the time span between the …rst and second attempt leads to (i) an increase in e 1 and p 1 , and (ii) a decrease in p 2 . (iii) The overall passing probability P may increase or decrease. 
Conditional Second Attempt
Up to now we have assumed that all students who fail at the …rst attempt have an unconditional second attempt for passing the exam. A fail with zero points is very much the same as a fail just below the pass rate. Especially when the maximum number of attempts is large, the continuation payo¤ will be large and it will be optimal to invest very little e¤ort at the …rst attempts. In order to prevent students looking for more bang for their buck, the school may set a minimum requirement. For instance, students qualify for the second attempt only if their …rst attempt result is not less than k percent of the passing standardq 1 . Students with a …rst attempt result less than kq 1 have failed de…nitively.
In such a scenario, the probability of attending the second attempt is given by prob(kq 1 q <q 1 ) = F (q 1 e 1 ) F (kq 1 e 1 ). The expected utility reads EU = p 1 R 1 V (e 1 ) + [F (q 1 e 1 ) F (kq 1 e 1 )]CP . The optimal e 2 is not a¤ected by the minimum requirement. Let us turn to the …rst attempt and switch o¤ the memory e¤ect, = 0. Totally di¤erentiating the FOC for the optimal e¤ort at the …rst attempt,
] CP V 0 (e 1 ) = 0, with respect to k yields
The higher the minimum requirement k, the lower is the probability of attending the second attempt, the lower is the expected continuation payo¤, and the higher is the optimal e¤ort e 1 . The case of k = 1 replicates the one exam opportunity. Concerning the overall pass probability P = p 1 + prob(kq 1 q <q 1 ) p 2 , the impact of a minimum requirement cannot be signed unambigously. But our simulations suggest that for almost all parameter constellations the negative e¤ect of a lower probability of attending the second attempt outweighs the positive e¤ect of the higher optimal e¤ort e 1 .
Proposition 8 A minimum requirement for the second attempt (i) is neutral for e 2 , and (ii) increases e 1 and p 1 . (iii) The overall passing probability P decreases for almost all parameter constellations.
Malus Points Account
In Germany, many higher education institutions make use of a malus points account. Take for instance the economics department of the University of Cologne, where each Bachelor student with a study program of 180 credit points has a scope of 60 permissible malus points. Should module exams carrying more than 60 credit points in total have been failed, the Bachelor's examination has been failed de…nitively. Within the scope of the permissible malus points, the student has the right to repeat a failed module. Suppose the student takes two tests, module A and module B. The student now splits the learning e¤ort into …rst attempt e¤ort for module A and …rst attempt e¤ort for module B, e A1 and e B1 , respectively. To ensure that the maximum number of fails is lower than the number of modules, we permit one fail. To qualify for a second attempt in module A (B), the student must have passed module B (A) in the …rst attempt. The expected utility is given by
To allow for a meaningful comparison with the already discussed examination rules, the e¤ort costs have to be assumed as additive separable in e A1 and e B1 .
Suppose that the student fails the …rst time in module A (B) and passes in module B (A), so that s/he is allowed to take part in the resit of module A (B). In this case, the student will be back in the situation of the one exam opportunity.
Turn to the …rst attempt. Let us switch o¤ the memory e¤ect, = 0, and let us focus on module A. The considerations for module B are analog. The FOC for the optimal e A1 is
The lower the passing probability for module B, p B1 , the lower is the expected continuation payo¤ of module A. This is an incentive to exert more e¤ort to pass module A already at the …rst attempt, e A1 increases compared to the case of an unconditional second attempt. The increase in e A1 will be reinforced by the fact that a pass in module A is a precondition for a repeat of module B. Qualifying for a repeat of module B is part of the utility gain of a higher e¤ort level e A1 . The higher e A1 , the higher is p A1 , and the higher is the probability of getting the expected continuation payo¤ of module B, (1 p B1 )CP B . The increase in e A1 leads to a higher p A1 , but that cannot outweigh the negative e¤ect of the requirement to pass module B at the …rst attempt. Thus, the overall pass probability declines.
Proposition 9
Suppose that a pass of module B (A) is a precondition for a resit in module A (B). Then (i) e A1 as well as p A1 increase, whereas (ii) e A2 and p A2 remain una¤ected. (iv) The overall pass probability declines compared to the case of an unconditional second attempt for module A.
9
To gain some intuition for the di¤erential e¤ects of the examination rules, we provide a numerical example. E¤ort is stated as percentage share of learning time in total time, e i is thus bounded between zero and one. The educational attainment function is speci…ed as (e i ) = e i with 2 (0; 1]. The e¤ort costs are given by V (e i ) = e i with > 1. For the reward, we choose R 1 = R 2 = 2. The random variable " follows a logistic distribution F (") with zero mean. The school sets the passing standard at q 1 =q 2 = 0:5. Table 1 presents the results for = 0:5 and = 2.
The option of an unconditional second attempt lowers e 1 by about one third. A memory e¤ect ( = 0:5) reinforces the decline, but raises the overall pass probability. To allow for a relative comparison of the rules, the size of the "shock" caused by the substitution of a new examination rule for the unconditional second attempt has to be the same across the rules. For given e 1 and e 2 from the unconditional second attempt, the switch to the malus account, the introduction of a charge Z, the reduction of R 2 , the increase ofq 2 , and the introduction of a minimum requirement have to be identical in terms of the decline in student expected utility. For = 0, this requires Z = 0:34CP , Table 1 : E¤ort and passing probabilities under di¤erent examination rules R 2 = 1:453,q 2 = 0:692, and k = 0:536. In the zero-time-span scenario the policy parameter is already …xed to zero, there is no room for manipulating this parameter to ensure a given EU . Subsequent to the introduction of the new rule, (the next generation of) students reoptimize. From the student point of view, a zero time span between two attempts is the superior examination rule. Because of the drop of the e¤ort costs V (e 2 ), the lowering of EU is at its minimum. Compared to the unconditional second attempt, even an increase in EU is possible. Focussing on already implemented rules (i.e. excluding the conditional second attempt), the malus account maximizes e¤ort and educational attainment, but at the same time it minimizes the overall pass probability P . Compared to the minimum requirement for a resit, the malus account system results in higher levels of e¤ort, educational attainment, pass probabilities, and EU , whereas the conditional second attempt leads to the lowest P . The charge for the second attempt delivers the highest P , but it also delivers the lowest EU .
Conclusions
In this paper it is shown how rational students reallocate their learning e¤ort as a response to a charge for the second exam attempt, a cap on the maximum resit mark, an adjustment of the passing standard, a variation of the time span between two attempts, a minimum requirement to qualify for the second attempt, and a malus points account. By setting such rules, the school is able to manipulate student e¤ort towards the …rst attempt. The e¤ort maximizing rule is the malus account, a charge for the second attempt delivers the highest overall passing probability. Because of a lack of a wellde…ned social welfare function, we cannot provide a clear-cut ranking in terms of welfare. This is an important issue for future research.
